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Center
Professional NEWSLETTER
Ethics at Case Western Reserve University
WINTER 1995
DIRECTOR’S CORNER by Robert P. Lawry
1 am delighted to report that the C.P.E. has received a generous $200,000 grant from 
the 1525 Foundation to conduct a Summer Ethics Institute over the next two years. The Institute 
is designed to help faculty throughout the University develop a deeper understanding of ethics, 
so they may do more ethics teaching themselves within their own disciplines. This idea of 
pursuing ethics education throughout the curriculum is a direct result of a recommendation made 
several years ago in a report to C. W.R. U. President Agnar Pytte by an Ad Hoc Committee 
established to investigate the state of teaching ethics in the undergraduate school. Thus, special 
consideration will be given to undergraduate teachers in looking at applicants for the Institute. 
John Bassett, the Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences, is very supportive of this effort, having 
established ethics as one of the key themes of curriculum reform in the undergraduate school.
More details of the grant are set forth in another part of this newsletter; so I will not 
elaborate further on it. However, 1 would like to extend a deep public bow to Susan Jaros, 
Associate Vice President for Development and Alumni Affairs, for her indefatigable efforts over 
several years to find this money for us; and to President Pytte, not only for his direct help in 
obtaining this grant, but also for his continued support of the C.P.E. and the cause of ethics 
education in the University.
For me this a dream come true. 1 can’t wait to welcome the 15 colleagues who will join 
with us in June, 1996, to deepen the ethics dialogue at C.W.R. U.
The bulk of this Newsletter is taken up by a thoughtful article, penned by Brenda Wirkus, 
our colleague and friend from John Carroll, who directs the Ethics Program there. 1 asked 
Brenda and our own Tom Murray, Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics, if they would 
lead us in a discussion of the very basic and very tricky question: Why Be Moral? They did so 
at our Dialogue Luncheon on November 2nd. Their opening statements were so thoughtful, 1 
asked each if they would take their notes and develop them into a short article for all the readers 
of this Newsletter to be similarly stimulated. 1 managed to track Brenda down in University 
Heights, and she said 1 asked so nicely, she couldn’t refuse. On the other hand, last time I 
checked, Murray was flying off to Germany to give a talk at an international bioethics 
conference. Or was he just trying to elude me? Meanwhile, read Brenda. It will make you 
think ... and ponder.
WHY BE MORAL?
(Author's Note: This talk was originally presented as part of the Nov. 2, 1995, 
"Ethics Dialogue Luncheon " series. What follows is a slightly more forma! version of 
that talk, one still designed to provoke thought rather than to resolve philosophical 
quandaries.)
My initial and almost automatic response to the question "Why be moral?" is 
"because I couldn't live with myself if I weren't." Always wary of answers predicated 
upon the precarious state of my own psyche, I thought 1 needed to investigate further. 
"Why couldn't I live with myself if I weren't moral?" But that didn't seem to advance 
my inquiry very much. Besides,, one of my good friends reminded me that my answer 
was hardly going to persuade anyone else except, maybe, those suffering from similar 
psychological diseases.
Once upon a time, moral philosophers would have addressed the question "Why 
be moral?" by attempting to provide a foundation for morality, by attempting to 
ground it and anchor it in something else. Often they turned to "nature" as the 
ground; "nature" sometimes meant human nature and sometimes the structure of the 
universe, the "order of things," often "the order of things as produced by a creator." 
And, frequently, "human nature" had something to do with "rationality," often 
premised upon a belief that its creator is rational. But in the wake of pragmatism and 
postmodernism at the end of the 20th century, that infrastructure appears increasingly 
shaky.
Many who argue that morality is natural maintain that being moral is just part 
of what it means to be human, what separates us from the animals. Anthropological 
studies do indicate a moral structure in all human societies, and can even offer an 
account of deviance from moral codes due to extreme environmental changes.
Others claim that morality is part of the natural order ordained by God. For 
them, it is still necessary to investigate nature in order to determine right and wrong 
actions, and we are still capable of making mistakes about that nature (because our 
mind is imperfect and cannot read God's mind). But in that context it makes no 
sense to ask whether one ought to be moral. And, in many such traditions, deciding 
not to be moral risks punishment by God.
Finally, the answer that it is somehow "rational" to be moral takes many forms 
in the history of philosophy, in philosophers ranging from Plato to Kant. To 
investigate these many forms would entail something along the lines of a doctoral
dissertation. Let it suffice to say that much of the history of philosophy, aMeast until 
the 19th century, consists of many and varied attempts to ground morality in some 
picture of rationality.
I asserted above that these foundations have become increasingly unsteady, 
that these answers are less satisfying than they once were. Language about the 
"natural" often presupposes the existence of God. Therefore, it obviously cannot 
work as well in our pluralistic world as it would have, for example, in the shared 
worldview of medieval, monotheistic Europe. Or else language about the "natural" 
is based upon an ontology about which 20th-century thinkers have become quite 
wary, a realist ontology based upon an epistemology of discovery rather than social 
construction. Or sometimes language about the "natural" is derived from empirical 
data from certain societies that generalizes to all humans, leaving us with concerns 
about the soundness of inductive conclusions.
The language of "rationality" leaves us with many of the concerns cited in the 
above paragraph as well as with different worries depending upon the different 
philosophical presentation. But even supposing that we accep.t the answer that it is 
rational for US to be moral, that doesn't explain why I - why any one single individual 
- should be moral. What I have in mind here is someone who is perfectly rational and 
perfectly calculating and perfectly deliberative. This kind of person wants everyone 
else to act morally so that s/he can have certain expectations and figure out how to 
plan his/her life to work around them. And thereby act immorally with impunity. I am 
reminded here of the story of the ring of Gyges, recounted by Plato in his Republic, 
Book II (359b-360e). Gyges found a ring which made him invisible and proceeded to 
seduce the king's wife, kill the king, and take over his kingdom. Glaucon's argument 
in this passage is that anyone who thought he could get away with acting immorally 
would do so. That somehow it is not irrational to act immorally, especially if others 
continue to act morally.
So I'm back where I started. Some of the standard philosophical answers to 
"why be moral" seem less impressive now than once they might have for reasons 
cited above and more. I'm back to my "I couldn't live with myself any other way" 
answer. Rather than dismiss this merely as an indication of my (possibly aberrant) 
psychological state, let's explore it a bit more seriously.
The idea of "living with oneself" has something to do with one's image or 
picture of oneself and how that fits into the larger picture of one's life as some sort 
of narrative. This image or picture goes beyond a particular moral theory and asks, 
instead, for an analysis of "a good life."
What makes a life "good"? What a question! While we cannot but begin to 
answer it, let me try here to develop a few thoughts. Two things we seem to value 
are friendship/love and "self-realization'V'self-actualization." I am not sure whether 
friendship and love are the same; I know that we have neither the time nor the space 
here to make distinctions between them. They do seem, however, to be related. The 
language of "self-realization" and ’'self-actualization" comes out of a philosophical 
tradition tied to Hegel but exemplified in the works of certain Anglo-American 
Hegelians (Green, Royce, Bradley, Bosanquet). That language has since been 
appropriated by the psychologists for different ends and with different meanings. By 
"self-realization" I mean simply the potential to develop oneself freely by confronting 
and trying out a variety of possibilities.
Both of these (friendship/love and self-realization/self-actualization) are extra­
moral goods or values. I am not prepared here to argue that they are universal values, 
although I find it hard to imagine anyone who would not value them. I am fairly 
certain that the practices that go along with them are NOT universal but vary over 
time and across cultures. At the very least, within our culture they are perceived to 
be good. These goods follow from certain other goods, things like self-respect. And 
while these may all appear to be individual goods, and of course they are, they are 
also goods obtainable only in and through our relationships with others. That is, they 
can be acquired only in community/ies. This is easy to see with friendship and love 
(although it disturbs me no end to see our popular culture insist that you can only love 
someone else if you love yourself first. I think that's entirely wrong-headed.).
It's a bit more difficult to see that self-realization, self-actualization, depends 
upon community/ies. But a moment's reflection, here, can help to illustrate that. To 
truly become/actualize/realize oneself, one needs to be able to envision a range of 
possible selves one might become. One needs to develop one's potentials, simply 
put. But how does one discover what one's potentials are, except by trying out a 
number of different things within community, except by getting feedback from others? 
This process is ongoing and interactive; none of us, I suspect, wants to become a 
static self. Few of us, philosophically, any longer believe in a substantial self. We 
want new possibilities and new options, all of which are constructed by our 
community/ies. But any such community can only foster the kinds of growth, change, 
and actualization I'm suggesting if, in fact, it is structured to allow the flourishing of 
those possibilities for everyone within it. Because my self-realization depends upon 
the realization of others, and because that is a process of continuing but changing and 
re-negotiated relationships, the social structure must maximize freedom for those 
relationships and their renegotiation. And MORALITY is the name I would give to 
that structure and those processes. Obviously, the greater the array of possibilities 
for experimentation and negotiation, and the greater array of pictures of possible
personhood provided, the more moral the society.
Thus, the various communities in which we participate provide options and 
teach us what counts as a good life. To refuse to engage actively with others in 
those processes of conversation and negotiation, to refuse to participate openly in 
those communities, is to refuse to be moral. And to do that is to alienate oneself 
from the very sources of self-construction.
I view this essay as just one preliminary piece of a conversation about morality. 
I've left much of this vague and undeveloped. But let me conclude with just one 
thought. Many will argue that my position lends itself to relativism, to the view that 
any society is self-contained and constructed and so immune to criticism from 
outside, because I've offered no universal, over-riding, absolute values. After all, our 
picture of "the good life" might look very different from one produced by another 
community. I would respond that, first of all, we all participate in any number of 
communities, include the world or global community, and these communities are 
interconnected and interrelated. They, too, should be talking with one another. 
Secondly, I would argue that even without some universal, absolute moral rules, we 
can still evaluate communities according to the criteria I've suggested above. Do they 
promote a larger or smaller range of possibilities for self-realization? Do they promote 
more or fewer ways of negotiating with one another? Do they allow all members to 
participate in these processes, or do they exclude some? Are members free to change 
membership in communities, or are they tied permanently to them?
In short, I think the moral skeptic is not easily defeated. But I suspect that 
many of us will admit to having a picture of our "better" selves that guides us through 
life, a picture which helps us set standards, a picture against which we can measure 
our progress as moral beings, a picture which is open-ended and allows us to develop 
new pictures, a picture which is refined in and through our relationships with others. 
And perhaps that's enough.
- Brenda A. Wirkus, Ph.D. 
John Carroll University 
Associate Professor of 
Philosophy and 
Director, Program in 
Applied Ethics
A MILESTONE FOR THE C.P.E.
Since its inception in the Fall of 1978, the Center for Professional Ethics has been 
dedicated to the ethical education and development of students within the University. Through 
the years the Center has sponsored an array of activities aimed at increasing ethical awareness 
in the faculty, as well as the students. In spite of the success of these programs there remained 
one long-range goal that appeared to be almost unachievable; but in October of this year that 
dream finally became a reality.
October, 1995, is when the 1525 Foundation awarded a $200,000 grant to the C.P.E. to 
fund a Summer Fellowship Program for the next two years. The purpose of this program is 
intensify the knowledge of ethics among the undergraduate faculty at C.W.R.U., enabling them 
to incorporate ethics into courses in their own disiplines. Upon conclusion of this program 30 
Fellows (15 per year) will have designed a course or a substantial part of a course they presently 
teach or will teach within the next two years to reflect ethics content.
Fellows will be chosen from applications of faculty members from the entire university 
community. Some preference will be given to faculty who teach primarily in the undergraduate 
curriculum, because it was a study of that need which was the impetus for seeking the grant. 
Fellows will be expected to spend most of their working hours in June to a study of ethics. 
They will each receive a stipend of $3,000 for their efforts plus materials and special meals.
Obtaining this grant marked a red-letter day for the C.P.E. We hope that the university 
community will feel the same when the Fellows begin to introduce ethics into their classes.
NEWS & NOTES * * *
CONFERENCES:
The Association for Practical 
and Professional Ethics 
announces its fifth annual 
meeting to be held February 29- 
March 2, 199 6 in St. Louis. 
Amy Gutmann will deliver the 
keynote address “Responses to 
Racial Injustice.” Gutmann is 
an accomplished author, as well 
as. Dean of the Faculty and 
Professor of Politics at 
Princeton University. Other 
features at the meeting will 
be: a conference on Public 
Service Ethics and Public 
Trust, Colloguium on Ethics 
Centers and Programs, a 
symposium on Casuistry and 
Breakfast with an Author. For 
more information contact the 
APPE, 410 North Park Avenue, 
Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone 
(812) 855-6450 or Fax (812) 
855-3315.
* * *
On March 7-9, 1996 California 
State University, Long Beach is 
sponsoring its 7th Annual 
Conference on Applied Ethics 
entitled “Facing the Challenge: 
The Ethical Stretch." This 
event, which will be held at 
the Hilton Hotel in Long Beach, 
CA, was designed to promote 
continuous improvement in the 
practice and theory of ethics 
across the professions. The 
conference identifies, but is 
not limited to, five major 
areas of discussion on ethics: 
Law, Education, Business, 
Government and International 
Ethics. Contact Delona Davis 
for information by phone (310) 
985-8222 or fax (310) 985-5842.
An event titled “Ethical Issues 
and Technology Utilization” on 
March 9, 1996 will be the First 
Annual Ethics and Technology 
Conference sponsored by Loyola 
University in Chicago. The 
following topics may be 
covered: Ethical Standards, 
Equal Access, Students with 
computers and Software Ethics. 
For information contact Dr. 
Linda Salchenberger; Dept, of 
Management Science; School of 
Business; Loyola University 
Chicago; 820 N. Michigan Ave.; 
Chicago, IL 60611-2103.
* * *
The Department of Medical 
Humanities at the East Carolina 
University School of Medicine 
and Bioethics Center announces 
a conference to be held on 
March 18, 1996. The conference 
"Controversies in Bioethics”
will discuss issues about the 
end of life, moral decision 
making and managed care. 
Contact Katherine McGinnis by 
phone at (919) 816-8214 or by 
fax (919) 816-8596 for more 
information.
WORKSHOPS:
Indiana University is inviting 
nominations for the "Research 
Ethics in Education” workshop 
designed to prepare leaders of 
the next generat ion of 
scientists and engineers to 
confront significant issues in 
research ethics. Participant 
support will be offered. 
Deadline is March 1, 1996. For 
eligibility requirements and 
other information contact Brian 
Schrag by phone at (812) 855- 
6450 or fax (812) 855-3315.
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